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Traditionally, disaster assistance was available on an ad hoc basis, but the 2008 Farm Act 
provides a standing disaster assistance program known as Supplemental Revenue Assistance 
(SURE).  This paper introduces a theory of nested insurance to evaluate the impact on of SURE 
on intensification, acreage and adoption. The results suggest that parameters of a government 
program like SURE may enhance the adoption and value of crop insurance to the farm sector. A 
quantitative understanding of the interdependencies between programs like SURE and crop 
insurance, taking into account the nature of the ad hoc alternative, is important in assessing the 
welfare impacts on farmers, as well as insurance companies. Both our theory and simulation 
exercise suggest that insurance increases the volume of production and/or leads to increased 
intensification (substitution into higher value crops). On the other hand, the gains from insurance 
and from programs like SURE may be lessened by the presence and probability of ad hoc 
disaster assistance.  
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  2The Economics of Nested Insurance: The Case of SURE 
 
Farming is a risky business. One of the realities of modern life is that farmers need to deal with 
multiple tools to address risk. Recently, it has been advanced that the risks can be addressed in 
aggregate by revenue assurance, but since the magnitude of the risk can vary drastically, the 
same random variable may be targeted by two programs. Historically, farmers could rely on a 
standardized crop insurance program to deal with moderate to extreme risk, while ad hoc disaster 
assistance programs that dealt with extreme risks.  The 2008 Farm Act introduced the 
Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) program, which is a standing disaster 
assistance program that explicitly and structurally linked to traditional multi-peril crop insurance.  
While there is an established literature on the economics of regular insurance, a conceptual 
understanding of both adoption and impact of nested insurance is lacking, and this paper 
provides a framework to address this issue.  
Two key questions that are addressed by this framework are: under what conditions will 
farmers adopt insurance which includes a nested disaster program, and what will be the impact of 
adoption on scale of operations? To answer these questions, we first develop first a conceptual 
framework where we reduce the farmer’s choice problem to be a function of the mean and 
variance of revenue per acre under a given insurance program. Then, we analyze how changing 
policy parameters affects participation and farm size through their impacts on the moments of the 
revenue distribution per acre. Finally, we present a simulation exercise identifying further 
challenges that the analysis requires. 
 
 
  3Background 
The USDA operates programs that provide financial support to farmers in the form of payments 
or low interest loans to compensate them for crop losses due to natural disasters.  In addition, 
despite significant growth in insured acreage under the Federal crop insurance program, 
Congress has continued to pass legislation providing ad hoc disaster assistance payments to 
producers in response to drought and other adverse events. Ad hoc support varies substantially 
from year to year depending on the weather and whether the ad hoc legislation gets passed that 
covers a disaster(s). For instance, crop disaster outlays including noninsured assistance (NAP) 
were $75 million in 2008 but $2.5 billion in 2005.   
With the 2008 Farm Act, Federal agricultural legislation includes for the first time a 
formal disaster assistance program, known as the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments 
(SURE) program, which provides producers benefits for 2008 through 2011 crop year farm 
revenue losses due to natural disasters. SURE is a whole farm program that provides 
supplemental payments to farmers with Federal crop insurance and NAP in a “disaster county” (a 
county declared by the Secretary of Agriculture to have suffered weather-related production 
losses of 50 percent or more, and contiguous counties), subject to other conditions. Essentially, 
SURE payments would cover a portion of the farmer’s insurance deductible, with the payment 
level increasing with the amount of the farmer’s insured coverage. Sign-up for the 2008 SURE 
began January 2010. Being a free supplement to crop insurance, SURE is likely to impact land 
use and crop insurance decisions, and to a different extent than would an ad hoc disaster regime, 
particularly in regions where high yield variability could result in frequent disaster declarations.  
In a deterministic analysis, Smith and Watts (2010) find that SURE has the potential for creating 
moral hazard conditions on top of those already associated with Federal crop insurance. 
  4Arguably, a key political motivation for SURE is that it has become increasingly difficult 
over time to pass ad hoc payments into law.   In principle, one may assume that the SURE 
program would eliminate the ad hoc payments, but this assumption appears to be unrealistic. 
Indeed, in late 2009 and early 2010, the head of the Senate Agricultural committee pressed for ad 
hoc assistance for farm losses in some regions in 2009 due to bad weather.  
 
Conceptual Model 
We consider a risk-averse farmer facing choices about adoption of crop insurance and aggregate 
land use (e.g., when acreage is variable, the conversion of marginal lands to crops). If the farmer 
does not adopt crop insurance, he accepts the natural revenue variability associated with his farm 
size, but for large losses he may receive government assistance with some positive probability. If 
he does adopt crop insurance, disaster assistance is nested in the sense that it provides 
supplemental coverage. Evaluating these farmer decisions will help to shed some light on the 
potential effects of the SURE program, which provides supplemental disaster insurance for free – 
but only to those farmers who purchase crop insurance.
1  
Consider a farmer with a vNM utility function, u, which is everywhere increasing and 
concave in income. The farmer has a number of acres, A, with identical revenues per acre, Y, so 
that total revenue is given by AY.  Y is a non-negative random variable with continuous, 
cumulative distribution function, F. The cost of production is a function of acreage, cA, which 
is increasing and at least weakly convex in A. In the US, this model of farm size choice is most 
applicable in regions where in some counties marginal lands are available for inclusion in 
farming operations at some cost, such as some counties in the Dakotas. The idea of variable 
acreage would make less sense in the context of corn farming in Illinois, where the supply of 
()
  5farmland is almost perfectly inelastic.  The farmer’s profits depend on two choices – whether to 
participate in the insurance program (a discrete choice, where i =1 denotes participation and 
 denotes non-participation), and the level of acreage,  . Conditional on the participation 
choice, we define the profit function as 
i = 0 A
π A,i ( )= AY
i − cA ( ). Thus, given the distribution of Y
i, 
which is impacted by policy/insurance parameters, the farmer maximizes expected utility over 
acreage as follows: 
Euπ






 vi ()= max
A EuA [ cA () () ]
 
where
So we assume a backwards inductive approach, where the farmer maximizes the expected 
utility, v(i), of the adoption choice after selecting the optimal farm size for each policy option.  
Because the adoption and acreage choice both depend on the distribution of revenue, Y
i, we 
specify the revenue per acre as a function of policy parameters here. 
Disasters for the purpose of ad hoc assistance are generally determined on the basis of 
yield losses due to natural causes.  For the sake of generality, the theoretical model assumes that 
the disasters declarations are triggered by revenue losses due to natural causes.  From the 
theoretical perspective, a disaster declaration based on yield losses is a special case that is 
examined in our empirical section.  
First, Y
0 denotes revenue per acre without crop insurance, but with probabilistic ad hoc 
government disaster assistance. Without any intervention, the revenue per acre is simply, Y. 
When revenues fall below a certain level, the disaster threshold, D= F
−1 d ( ), then there is a 
positive probability, 0 <ϕ ≤ 1, that the government will intervene with disaster payments. For a 
standing program on the other hand, ϕ = 1. The ad hoc intervention can be conceptualized as the 
government declaring a disaster area when revenues are below a certain percentile of the revenue 
  6distribution and passing legislation that provides payments. When the government does 
intervene, the farmer’s revenue per-acre is restored to an upper-threshold level of revenues, 
, which may be the mean or median of the revenue distribution, for example. Letting  T = F
−1 t ()
Id be an indicator variable for Y ≤ D
cA () |ϕ,
, the expected profits with probabilistic ad hoc assistance 
only is given by: 
EA Y
0 − d,t [] ≡ EA Y1−ϕ⋅Id ( ) [ ]+ϕ⋅d⋅ AT −cA ()  
On the other hand, the farmer can buy crop insurance to limit the amount of risk faced in 
production. To simplify the analysis, we assume the crop insurance uses the same upper 
threshold,  T, to calculate the indemnity payment as follows. Whenever Y ≤ T, to which we 
assign the indicator variable, It
) Y
d,t [] =
, the crop insurance pays reimbursement of  , where R is 
the reimbursement rate. This coverage comes at a premium of P per acre. Thus, whenever 
revenue is below the upper threshold and no disaster assistance is provided, the crop insurance 
serves to restore revenue to a linear combination of actual revenue, Y, and the upper threshold, T. 
Thus, letting Y , the expected profits when crop insurance is adopted without 
nested disaster insurance, like SURE: 
R⋅ T − ( Y)
R ≡ TR + 1− ( R
EA Y
1 −cA () |R,P,ϕ, EY⋅ 1− It ( )+YR ⋅It ⋅ 1−ϕ⋅Id ( ) [ ]+ϕ⋅d⋅T −cA () − AP
 
  Note that the presence of supplemental disaster insurance within the crop insurance 
program (i.e., SURE) can simply be represented as a higher level of the reimbursement rate, R, 
conditional on Y falling below the disaster threshold. Letting β be the increased reimbursement 
rate for disasters, the expected profits under crop insurance with nested disaster insurance 
become: 
  7EA Y
1 −cA () |R,P,ϕ,d,t [] =
EY⋅ 1− It () +YR ⋅It ⋅ 1− Id () +Yβ ⋅Id ⋅ 1−ϕ () [] +ϕ⋅d⋅T −cA () − AP
where Yβ ≡ TR +β () + 1− R−β () Y  
Variances of these two revenue distributions can be derived similarly. This analysis 
allows us to assess the impacts of changing parameters on the mean and variance of Y
i. 
Intuitively, increasing the disaster threshold, D, decreases the variance of Y and increases its 
mean, because it shifts values upwards toward the mean – and this holds whether or not crop 
insurance is adopted. The same rationale holds for the partial effects of the ad hoc intervention 
probability, ϕ, and for the insurance coverage rate, R. On the other hand, the insurance premium, 
P, has no effect on the variance of Y because it simply shifts all realizations downwards, so only 
its negative effect on expectation is relevant. The considerations are slightly more complex with 
respect to the crop insurance threshold, T, and the SURE parameter, β, depending on their 
levels. While increasing T always increases the expected revenue (whether or not crop insurance 
is present), this adjustment only lowers the variance of Y if T is lower than Y , because T 
approaching   from below brings values closer to the mean. On the other hand, T increasing 
beyond   can takes values further away from the mean when no crop insurance is present (i.e., 
ad hoc only), and the precise effect depends on specific functional forms when crop insurance is 
present, so the sign of the comparative static is ambiguous, in general. The same intuition holds 
for the SURE reimbursement parameter, β. 
Y 
Y 
Now that we have established the effect of key parameters on the revenue distributions, 
with and without adoption of crop insurance, we can assess the impact of changes in mean and 
variance on acreage and adoption choice. The approach we take follows a long tradition of using 
Taylor series approximation of expected utility (e.g., Sandmo, 1971;, Just and Zilberman, 1984;, 
  8Meyer, 1987) as a function of the mean and variance of key parameters, as well as average 
measures of risk aversion. While the approach is limited by an inability to consider higher 
moments, if the higher moments do not vary significantly across policy choices, then the impact 
of approximation error on adoption choice is small. However, it is difficult to derive theoretically 
meaningful conclusions without these approximations, and simulations are needed to assess the 
impact of these assumptions on land use choices.  
With respect to acreage, A, the first- and second-order conditions for expected utility 
maximization are given by: 
∂Euπ () []
∂A




2 = Eu '' π () ⋅ Y −c' A () () − u' π () ⋅c'' A () [] < 0
 
These conditions are sufficient for a unique, interior solution, which will allow us to 
derive comparative statics for parameters in the standard way. Our next step in drawing inference 
about behavior based on risk preference is a Taylor expansion of the first order condition about 
Y = EY [] ≡Y, as follows: 
Eu ' π () πA [] = E


















The second bracketed term is zero by the definition of the mean, since all its multiplicative 
elements are given numbers when evaluated at Y = Y . Thus, 
u' π  () πA + A
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  9where  , which can be easily shown as an implication of risk aversion, 
following Sandmo (1971).  
πA = EY [] −c' A () > 0
This first order condition can mean different things for the farmer’s choice, depending on 
risk preferences. We will examine two types of utility functions in this context, Constant 
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), each of which 





































For both types of utility functions, note that prudence (u  everywhere) is a necessary 
condition for the risk preferences described. Thus, the first order condition for 
'''> 0
A
* can be 
rewritten as: 
CARA ⇒ FOCA =1+ A
* ⋅
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CRRA ⇒ FOCA =1+ A
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  We use the first order conditions, as well as the effects of parameters on mean and 
variance per acre, to derive comparative statics results. First off, the first order condition allows 
us to take comparative statics of the acreage choice,  , as a function of mean and variance per 
acre, and accordingly, as a function of parameters via the chain rule. 
A
*
Proposition 1:  
CARA utility implies  AD
*,Aϕ
*,AR
* > 0 ;  AP
* < 0 ;  AT
* > 0 if  T <Y  ;  Aβ
* > 0 if  β <1− R. 
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where the multipliers on the partial effects are negative, and positive, respectively. The 
remainder of the proof follows directly from the partial effects of parameter increases on E[Y] 
and Var[Y], as discussed above. 
 
Given certain conditions, CRRA utility can imply comparative statics results with the 
same signs as implied by CARA utility. 
Corollary 1:  
CRRA utility implies the same signs for comparative statics results as CARA, if 
i)λ >
A
*πA ⋅ 2 +π A ()
2π−A
*πA
2 ; or 
ii)    (so CRRA  u= ln π () λ=1) and cA ( )= c⋅ A. 
Proof: The proof reduces to showing that the multiplier factors are equivalent to the CARA case 
for Var Y [] x and  E Y [] x (where subscripts again denote partial derivatives). i) Using the 
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which generates comparative statics results with the same signs as those of CARA utility when 
condition (i) is fulfilled. 
ii) Calculating  A









⎝  ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠  ⎟ 
−2
−Var Y [ ]⋅2πA ⋅ EY [ ]x +π A




⎝  ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠  ⎟  
  11which generates comparative statics results with the same signs as above. 
  Thus far, we have established the impacts of parameter changes on acreage within the 
adoption choice, but not inclusive of it. Recall that v(i) is the expected utility of adoption or non-
adoption, given that acreage will be optimized. Once the optimal acreages are determined, the 
farmer simply selects the expected utility maximizing policy, i.e., he adopts insurance if 
. To further investigate the effects of insurance policy on this choice, we 
evaluate it explicitly: 







ΔVar Y [] +
∂
2v
∂EY [] ∂Var Y []
ΔEY [] ⋅ΔVar Y []  
To get conclusive results, we need to approximate vi () as a function of the first two moments of 
the distribution of Y
i. As before, we use a second-order Taylor approximation about Y  to obtain: 
vi ()= u π Y  () () + Ai
* ⋅
Var Y [ ]
2
⋅u'' π Y  () ( ) 
By the approximation above, it is clear that higher mean is “good” and higher variance is “bad”, 
so any mean-variance bundle (defined over Y) which decreases variance and increases 
expectation will enhance adoption. In particular, using CARA and CRRA utility as above, we 











1 [] > 0 




ΔVar Y [ ]
ΔEY []
+
λ 1+ λ ( )
2π
2 Var Y
1 [] > 0 
  12Simply put, crop insurance will be adopted if its mean-variance bundle improves over that of ad 
hoc only. By our above results, acreage responds to changes in mean and variance with the same 
sign as the value function, v. Thus, adoption is more likely under higher reimbursement rate, R, 
lower premium, P, lower probability of ad hoc assistance, ϕ, and higher disaster threshold, D. 
As before, the marginal effects of changing the upper threshold, T, and the SURE extra 
reimbursement rate, β, will depend on their pre-existing levels. Thus, increasing either of these 
two variables may even increase adoption and reduce acreage simultaneously, or vice versa.  
Two further points are apparent; any distribution offered with higher mean and/or lower 
variance will be adopted and result in higher acreage, and as a special case, actuarially fair 
insurance (which preserves the mean and lowers the variance) will always be adopted and lead to 
more acres farmed.
2  However, questions of actuarial fairness of insurance and exposure to 
baseline risk are affected by the probability of government intervention, because actuarial 
fairness for the insurance company is different than actuarial fairness for the consumer (the 
farmer). This is because actuarial fairness from the insurance consumer’s perspective means that 
the expected cost to the insurer is less than the premium.   
While our conceptual analysis could identify some of the directional effects of policy 
choices on adoption and land-use, a simulation, accounting for the fine points of the policy, is 
required to get a more detailed understanding of the impacts of a program like SURE. The 
empirical simulations cover a representative farmer planting two crops in a county in South 
Dakota, a regional with high yield relative to the Corn Belt, and facing joint price and farm level 
yield densities.  The farmer is assumed to be moderately risk averse and maximizes the expected 
utility of wealth using acreage in each crop and the crop insurance coverage levels as choice 
variables. While a variety of simplifying assumptions are necessary to make the theoretical 
  13model tractable, our empirical implementation has a richer, “real life” model specifying farmers’ 
alternatives including diversifying crops (as opposed to size expansion). Furthermore, the 
simulation uses bootstrap procedures to solve problems that do not have closed form solutions to 
integrals, so we are not confined to approximations in the estimation section. 
 
Policy Background: Federal Crop Insurance and SURE 
By law, USDA must try to devise actuarially fair premium rates, where the fair premium is 
defined as the full cost of the premium, and not just the farmer paid portion. 
3Hence, a key 
source of producer return to crop insurance purchase is the premium subsidy. At 70 percent 
coverage, 59 percent of the full premium is paid by the Federal government.  If premiums are 
actuarially fair, the net return to producers would equal 59 percent of expected indemnities.
4 The 
expected indemnity, based on historical price/yield observations, is denoted as ) , , (
b
it it p y I θ  for 
coverage levelθ (=.70), i indexes the crop,  t indexes time,  it y is the producer’s actual production 
history (APH) yield, and  is the base price for the crop.  
b
it p
  While a variety of Federal crop insurance products are available, we focus on Revenue 
Assurance (RA).  Under the base price option, an RA indemnity is paid when realized revenue 
falls below the guarantee, which equals the RA base price multiplied by the producer’s APH 
yield and the coverage level. The per-acre indemnity is:      




it it y p y p p y I − = θ θ , 0 max ) , , ( 
where is the RA base price,  is the RA realized price (both prices defined by futures 
markets), and is the actual yield. To clarify notation and unite the concepts of our theoretical 
model with the actual policy parameters, note that Y in the theoretical model would be equal to 
b
it p it p
it y
pityit in the empirical specification. It is important to remember that the empirical model 
  14explicitly models sources of randomness to be variation over space and time, whereas the 
theoretical model leaves the source of randomness unspecified. The emphasis on variation over 
time in the empirical model allows us to incorporate historical data for simulation. 
   SURE payments.   This section presents the details of calculating SURE payments which 
are essential to a realistic computation of the tradeoffs faced by farmers, and interpretation of the 
policy parameters. This exact analysis is crucial for the simulation, but may not be of interest to a 
reader emphasizing the conceptual understanding. Supplemental Revenue Assistance (SURE) is 
a whole farm program that provides supplemental payments to farmers who purchase crop 
insurance either through the Federal crop insurance program or through the Noninsured Crop 
Disaster Assistance Program (NAP).  As most crop acreage in the regions we examine is 
insurable through the former, we focus on SURE as it applies to crops eligible for Federal crop 
insurance.
 SURE is analytically described in Carriazo, Claassen and Cooper (2009) and Smith 
and Watts (2010), but our description is updated to account for the SURE regulations released in 
December 2009.  
SURE payments can be made only to producers who are located in counties where a 
disaster has been declared (the Secretary of Agriculture determines that there has been a weather-
related production loss of 50 percent or more), counties contiguous to disaster counties, or to any 
producer who experiences production 50 percent or more below normal levels.  In addition, 
producers must suffer a 10 percent production loss to at least one crop of economic significance 
on their farm in order to be eligible for SURE. The level of the SURE payment is: 
  ,  ) 0 ), ( 60 . 0 max(
T
t t t t t R G D − ∗ Ψ ∗ Ω =
where  is the SURE guarantee and  is total farm revenue, and where:  t G
T
t R
  15t Ω is an indicator function equal to 1 if either a disaster is declared in the farmer’s county or in a 
contiguous county or if actual production on the farm is 50 percent or less than normal 
production, as measured by overall revenue, and 0 otherwise. The normal production on the 




ity p ) ( . The actual 
production on the farm is the sum of the value of the production produced, ∑  N o t e  




ity p ) (.
t Ψ  is indicator function equal to 1 if the 10 percent yield loss trigger is met for any of the 
eligible crops, or 0 otherwise.   
The SURE guarantee depends on the level of crop insurance coverage selected by the 
producer, expected prices, and the producer’s APH yield, but is limited to no more than 90 
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where   is planted acreage of crop i (or acreage where planting was prevented) and  is the 
producer’s counter-cyclical payment program yield or an “adjusted yield”.  Total farm revenue 
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where ) , , (
b
it it p y PREM θ is the producer paid insurance premium per acre,   is the p
(farm-level) total marketing loan benefits, t DP  is the p ucer’s total direct payment, t CCP  is the
cer’s total counter-cyclical payment, and  t ACRE  is the r’s total revenue payments 
it MLB roducer’s 
rod  
produ  farme
  16under the Average Crop Revenue Election program, where  t CCP  and  t E  are ally 
exclusive.
ACR  mutu
5 The price 
N
it p is the “National Average Market Price” as determined by the Deputy 
Administrator of USDA, which for the simulation we assume to be the national average cash 
price at harvest. 
For the proposes of our simulation, we assume that the Secretary makes a disaster 
declaration with probability φ for a county when county yield for any crop (corn, spring or 
winter wheat, and soybeans in our model) falls below 65 percent of expected county yield, as 
was the standard for the 2001 and 2002 ad hoc disaster programs.    
 
Empirical Simulation 
Modeling the Distribution of Yields and Prices. While the theoretical model assumed an 
abstract distribution of revenue per acre, the empirical analysis, as well as any computation 
involving actuarial fairness, must derive actual distributions as a basis for work. The theoretical 
model collapses the risk profile onto revenue per acre, but empirical estimation must build 
revenue per acre from the distributions of yield and price, taking account of correlations between 
the two. The remainder of this subsection is dedicated to estimating the joint distribution of per-
acre yield and price faced by farmers. We model the joint distribution of yields and prices for 
corn, soybeans, and spring wheat —the three major crops in Central South Dakota where most of 
our farms are located—using a method based on generating correlated within-season price and 
yield deviates in Cooper (2009a, 2009b).     
  Under this approach, national average yields are re-expressed as within-season yield 
deviations in year s as   = is ( ) ()
( Y Δ ) is
is is
Y E
Y E Y − , where expected yields, , are estimated by 
regressing average yields on a linear trend using data for s = 1975-2008.  Yields are detrended to 
) ( is Y E
  17base year 2008, where  () ( ) 1 2008 , + Δ = is i
d




.  County yields are detrended and transformed to 
deviation form (denoted as  ) using the same methods.  National average and county average 
yield data used in the analysis are obtained from National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).  





P E P −  where  is pre-season expect price.  For each crop, we follow Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) definitions of the expected and realized prices.  For the realized 
price of corn, for example, we use the average of the daily October prices of the December 
Chicago Board of Trade corn future in period t.  For the expected price we use the average of the 
daily February prices of the December CBOT corn future.  We also use the February and 
October prices for the December CBOT soybean contracts to represent expected and realized 
prices, respectively.  For hard red spring wheat, the expected and realized prices are obtained by 
averaging the closing prices March and August, respectively, for the Minneapolis Grain 
Exchange (MGE) September contract.   
) ( is P E
is P   Next, the relationship betweenΔ  and is econometrically estimated. We assume that
 can only be partially explained by , and that the uncertainty in this relationship can be 
incorporated into the empirical distribution as 
is Y Δ
is P Δ is Y Δ
   =  is P Δ ( ) is i z ε + , is Y g Δ    
where is a vector of other variables that may explain the price deviation and is z is ε  is the error 






Δ < 0, i.e., the greater the realization of national average yield over 
the expected level, the more likely harvest time price will be lower than the expected price. See 
  18Cooper (ibid.) for further model description and for the regression results that we use to simulate 
price deviations.    
We jointly estimate the distributions of price and yield deviations by repeated estimation 
of the equation above using a bootstrap procedure.  Specifically, a pairs bootstrap approach is 
used in a joint resampling methodology that involves drawing i.i.d. observations with 
replacement from the original data set (e.g., Yatchew).  Variation in estimates results from the 
fact that upon selection, each data point is replaced within the population.  The bootstrap 
procedure creates M sets of coefficient vectors representing uncertainty in the yield-price 
relationship.  That is, for each draw of a yield deviation, there exists a distribution of estimated 
price deviations. 
   Next, simulated yield vectors for and  , i = 1,..,3, are generated using a version o
the block-bootstrap approach (e.g., Lahiri) in which the pair-wise (defined over time) 
relationship between yield values is maintained across each crop and yield aggregation. We draw 
N times with replacement rows of  and  , i = 1,..,3, from the actual yield data to generate 
the simulated yield data, where N  =1000.   The simulated yield data maintains the underlying 
historical Pearson and rank correlation – as well as any other relationship between the variables – 








Finally, for each value simulated  value, we generate m = 1,…,M  simulated price 
deviations  based on the M coefficient vectors from the regression bootstrap. This process 
results in NM = 1,000,000 simulated values of   with pair-wise relationships maintained 




inm P ˆ Δ
inm P ˆ Δ
in Y Δ Y Δ
  19  To represent farm-level conditions, we inflate the standard deviation of county-level 
yields as per Carriazo, Claassen, and Cooper (2009).  Starting with county yields in deviation 
form, we select the inflation factor,  ci α (c indexes the county), such that the APH indemnity 
calculated from our yield distribution is equal to the APH premium: 
     () {}
2
2008 ,

















where  () [] ( ) [] {





in in Y Y z Y y σ σ α − ⋅ + =
) 1 )( ( 2008 ,
c
in c i Y y E Δ +α in z
} is from Cooper et al. (2009a),  
,  is a N(0,1) random variable, and
c
in Y = i ω  is the RMA premium rate 
calculated from RMA actuarial data (excluding the fixed rate load to avoid premium charges 
associated with disaster reserves and other factors not necessarily associated with farm-specific 
loss risk),  is the APH price, and the coverage rate,
APH
i p θ , is 0.65.   
  Description of the representative farmer and SURE payments. For our numerical 
simulation of famer decision-making in the presence of SURE, we use a representative farmer in 
Hyde County, South Dakota. Production in this county is relatively risky compared to the Corn 
Belt, and as such, is a region where disaster assistance is likely to be particularly relevant.   The 
farm is representative of the county in that its mean yield is the same as county yield, but its farm 
level yield variance is inflated over the county level using the approach discussed in the previous 
section.  We assume that the county level SURE trigger is based on losses in corn, soybeans, or 
spring wheat.  However, to reduce the potential for multiple optimal solutions to the farm level 
expected utility maximization exercise, we assume that the farmers intends to only grow corn 
and spring wheat in 2009. We chose this crop combination not to imply an agronomically 
desirable crop rotation, but simply to make the simulation more interesting as our farmer is 
relatively indifferent between soybean and spring wheat production. We assume that the farmer 
  20has maintained enrollment in the traditional commodity support programs rather than enrolling in 
the new ACRE program.  Under current expected prices, this means that the farmer receives 
fixed direct payments, but no marketing loan benefits or counter-cyclical payments.    
Table 1 presents various parameters and statistics relating to the representative farm.  The 
first few rows present the mean, standard deviation, and correlation matrix of the yield density 
function that are estimated for the representative farmer in Hyde County. The last row gives the 
2009 crop year planting time output prices around which the estimated price density functions 
are centered.  Where necessary in the simulations, the harvest time futures prices are converted 
national season average cash price based on the average of the previous five years basis 
difference between these two prices.   
Table 2 presents summary statistics for simulation results for 2009 for gross farm 
revenue, net indemnities for RA insurance, SURE payments, and total gross farm revenue (which 
includes the net indemnities and the SURE payments) for the farm with the yield densities 
summarized in Table 1, with the assumption that the farmer purchases 70% coverage for each 
crop.   Since revenue, insurance payments, and SURE payments are not distributed normally, we 
also present 90% empirical confidence intervals using the approach discussed in Efron (1987).  
The table presents three acreage scenarios. The acreage allocation in Scenario I mimics the 
actual acreage allocation for the three crops in Hyde County, SD. Scenario II drops soybeans and 
Scenario III drops corn and soybeans. These simulations portray the heterogeneity of returns that 
may be faced by farmers in the same region. 
In Table 2, at around $3 to $5.5/acre, mean SURE payments are small relative to gross 
farm revenue and even relative to RA net indemnities.  However, the 90% upper tail on SURE 
payments is approximately $30/acre, suggesting that they can become a relatively significant 
  21share of revenue per acre in years with substantial revenue losses.  The combination net 
indemnities and the SURE payments reduces the coefficient of variation of farm revenue by 28 
to 29%, but perhaps more importantly, it results in a substantial increase in the 90% lower 
bound, which is $0 for gross income in two of the three scenarios, but at least $158 with the 
insurance and SURE.  While we present these results for a representative farmer in one county, 
we have also estimated these payment and revenue figures for other counties in North and South 
Dakota and find the results to be similar to those in the table. 
The results in Table 2 show mean SURE payment increasing as the farmer’s crop 
diversity shrinks moving from Scenario I to III. This payment increase is due to revenue risk 
increasing the lower the number of unique crops grown.   However, the scope for moral hazard 
of SURE in reducing crop diversity may be minimized by the percentage decrease in the 
coefficient of variation of revenue being relatively constant across the three scenarios. 
Farmer Choices: Maximizing Expected Utility under CARA. Given the joint price and 
yield densities functions described above, we now turn to the simulation of EU maximizing 
behavior by the farmer. We assume that the farmer has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
and chooses acreage and insurance coverage to maximize the expected value of a negative 
exponential utility function over N·M = 1,000,000 simulated price and yield, and insurance 
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where λ is the absolute risk aversion coefficient and w is wealth. Wealth w is   plus net returns 
under four scenarios: 1) no insurance coverage; 2) insurance coverage; 3) insurance coverage 
and ad hoc payments; and 4) insurance coverage and SURE payments.   Wealth wj under each 
o w
  22scenario includes direct payments for corn, soybeans, and wheat, with the share of payments for 
each crop based on the number of base acres in each crop for Hyde county, valued at the base 
yield rates for that county, with the total value of these payment for being DP = $6.86 per acre. 
Note that these are annual fixed payments not requiring production of the crops, and hence, we 
include the soybean direct payments regardless of whether or not farmer grows soybeans. 
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where Ci is the production cost for each crop (i = 1,2), Dij is the total SURE payment (if 
applicable to the scenario), Iij(θ) is the per acre insurance indemnity, and PREMij(θ) is the 
insurance premium. To reduce the parameter space, we assume that the farmer choose a single 
insurance coverage rate for each θ crop. Note that under current expected prices, the probability 
of marketing loan benefits and counter-cyclical payments being issued are zero for the crops in 
question, and as such, are not included in wj.  
Table 1 provides the parameters – fertilizer and all other costs – used for the cost 
functions Ci, and are based on ERS/USDA cost estimates for the region that includes South 
Dakota.  To reflect increasing marginal costs as additional acreage is brought into production, 
and to reduce the probability of corner solutions in the simulations, we assume quadratic cost 
functions (e.g., Howitt, 1995) for each crop i,  ( )
2
1 0 i i i a a C ν ν + =  , where  0 ν is the parameter on 
the constant marginal costs and  1 ν the parameter on the increasing marginal costs.  We assume 
that marginal costs is increasing in fertilizer. 
  23We normalize our farm to one acre.  Initial wealth  is derived from USDA data as 
discussed in Carriazo, Claassen, and Cooper (2009) and is $833.54 for the one acre farm. We use 
two scenarios for the supply of land: 1) supply is completely inelastic and   ; and 2) 
supply is completely elastic.  In either case, to restrict the feasible parameter space in estimation, 
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We assume the farmer has a moderate risk aversion premium of 20 percent (e.g., Hurley, 
Mitchell, and Rice, 2004; Mitchell, Gray, Steffey, 2004). The associated absolute risk aversion 
coefficient λ is scaled to the standard version of net revenue for the one acre farm using the 
approach in Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman (1993). For our baseline standard deviation of 
$103.09 evaluated over our NxM simulated price and yield combinations, we assumed 0.27 acres 
of corn and 0.73 acres of wheat, θ =0.7, quadratic cost functions, and no SURE payments. The 
resulting  λ  = 0.003988. Note that as the coefficient of variation was similar across the two 
crops, for the simulation we raised the standard deviation of corn by 25 percent to make the 
analysis more interesting. 
We let the insurance coverage rate vary between 0 and 100 percent.  The actual range for 
RA coverage is 55 to 85 percent. However, the simulation approach allows us to find the 
farmer’s optimal coverage level, which can provide additional insights over staying within the 
range of actual program parameters.   Table 3 provides the simulation results for a farmer whose 
crop insurance premium is actuarially fair before the government insurance subsidy is applied.  
Hence, the final premium is advantageous to the farmer from an actuarial perspective. For the 
analysis in Table 4, the farmer’s actuarially fair premium is multiplied by 1/(1-0.59) before the 
the government insurance subsidy is applied.  Hence, the farmer’s actual premium is actuarially 
  24fair at a 70% coverage level, but fairness at other coverage rates depends on the RMA subsidy 
schedule.
5   
Finally, expected utility is maximized with respect to planted acres and insurance 
coverage level subject to the one or two constraints (depending on the land supply scenario) as a 
Lagrangean function using the Newton method with a STEPBT line search. The budget 
constraint was not binding in any of the scenarios, indicated the estimated shadow price on the 
budget constraint being zero in each case. 
Simulation Results. While in the simulation we have fixed acreage, there is a choice 
between corn and wheat. Corn is a high-risk, high-reward crop, so if insurance increases the 
acreage of corn, this is equivalent to intensification or increasing acreage, in the theoretical 
model. In the world of real policy options, the farmer faces a large menu of combinations of 
coverage rates and premiums. Looking at Table 3, and as expected from the theoretical model, 
the simulation where the insurance premiums are more than actuarially fair for the farmer, the 
farmer chooses a relatively high level of coverage (in gravitating towards more highly subsidized 
policies).  
In the case where land is constrained to 1, allowing the farmer to choose insurance causes 
a shift towards corn, which has a higher coefficient of variation than wheat for this farmer.  
However, adding ad hoc payments as well causes the farmer to shift acreage to spring wheat, 
which also happens when land supply is completely elastic in both the Table 3 and Table 4 
scenarios. Disaster payments in the county are invoked 14.4% of the time for corn and 18% of 
the time for spring wheat, which likely accounting for increased production of the latter when ad 
hoc payments are available.   
  25In the land constrained scenarios in Tables 3 and 4, adding ad hoc payments to the 
farmer’s revenue lowers the farmer’s optimal level of insurance coverage, which confirms the 
predictions of the theoretical section and results directly from constant absolute risk aversion. 
Also, as suggested by the theory, in the unconstrained land scenarios in both Tables, adding ad 
hoc payments to the farmer’s revenue leaves the farmer’s optimal level of insurance coverage 
unchanged; the farmer increases acreage instead.  
In both the Table 3 (advantageous insurance premiums) and Table 4 (approximately 
actuarially fair insurance premiums post subsidy) scenarios, adding SURE to insurance induces 
insurance coverage to increase for the former, but not for the latter. In fact, when land is 
constrained in table 4, SURE even induces a decrease in coverage. The results show the 
importance of subsidies in inducing adoption. 
Interestingly, in table 3 where land supply is elastic, the farmer’s optimal insurance 
coverage is greater than the actual 0.85 limit on θ, and binds up against the model’s upper limit 
of 1.0. This occurs in spite of the SURE guarantee Gt not being allowed to exceed 0.90 of 
expected revenue.  On the other hand, SURE total gross farm income Rt is a function of net 
indemnities, which receive a floor of zero in the calculation of Rt, and hence, the interactions 
between SURE and θ are relatively complex.
65 However, it is clear that subsidies of insurance 
premiums may lead to “corner solutions” characterized by full or maximal insurance. 
In either the Table 3 or Table 4 scenarios, adding the SURE payments do not induce 
acreage expansion relative to the scenarios with insurance only. In fact, in the table 4 scenario, 
adding SURE actually induces acreage to shrink relative to the case with insurance, although 
acreage under SURE is still higher than with no insurance.  Adding ad hoc assistance to the 
insurance scenario does cause acreage expansion, and especially in the case in Table 4, where the 
  26insurance is less desirable to the farmer than in the Table 3 scenarios. The key point here is the 
relative costs and benefits of insurance coverage vis-à-vis acreage. When the level of insurance 
coverage is chosen by the farmer, he may choose higher coverage rates and lower acreage 
depending on the parameters of the insurance and the resulting relative costs. Altogether, we find 
that the introduction of nested insurance leads to intensification and/or increased acreage. 
 
Conclusion 
Farmers may face a multitude of possible insurance arrangements for related risks, and this paper 
introduces a theory of nested insurance to evaluate the impact on intensification, acreage and 
adoption. The results suggest that parameters of a government program like SURE may enhance 
the adoption and value of crop insurance to the farm sector. A quantitative understanding of the 
interdependencies between programs like SURE and crop insurance, taking into account the 
nature of the ad hoc alternative, is important in assessing the welfare impacts on farmers, as well 
as insurance companies. Both our theory and simulation exercise suggest that insurance increases 
the volume of production and/or leads to increased intensification (higher value crops). On the 
other hand, the gains from insurance and from programs like SURE may be lessened by the 
presence and probability of ad hoc disaster assistance. Hence, a big challenge in designing and 
implementing a program like SURE is to limit alternative ad hoc arrangements.   
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  31Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for the estimated farm level density functions used for the 
Simulations  




Yield data (bu./acre) 
Mean   88.55  28.33 37.65
Standard   
deviation   51.31  14.75 20.00
  Yield correlation matrix 
Corn 1.000  0.082 0.115
Soybeans 0.082  1.000 0.081
S. Wheat  0.115  0.081 1.000
  
  Cost data ($/acre) 
Fertilizer ( 1 ν )  $93.31 $11.31 $44.21
All other ( 0 ν )  $148.03 $94.61 $65.54
  
 
Futures price data at planting, 2009 
crop year  ($/bu.) 
Output price   $4.05  $8.80 $6.20
  
Notes: The farm data was generated by scaling up the variance of estimated county level yield 
densities based on NASS/USDA data for Hyde County, South Dakota. Operating costs per acre 
are for the region including South Dakota (source: 2008  ERS Commodity Costs and Returns).  
   
 
 
  32Table 2. Gross farm returns, net insurance indemnities, and SURE payments (per acre) 
    
90% Empirical 











I.  Corn acres = 0.0258, soy acres = 0.0464, spring wheat acres = 0.6955 
Market revenue  277  114  25  602  0.412   
RA Net 
indemnities    23.70  36.27  0.00  159.29     
SURE payments  2.98  7.93  0.00  29.59     
Total revenue  304  89  179  602  0.294  -28.78% 
II.  Corn acres = 0.0271, soy acres = 0.0, spring wheat acres = 0.7294 
Market revenue  277  119  11  613  0.430   
RA Net 
indemnities 23.68  37.74 0.00  166.87     
SURE payments  3.48  8.75  0.00  29.91     
Total revenue  304  93  175  614  0.305  -29.11% 
III.  Corn acres = 0.0, soy acres = 0.0, spring wheat acres = 1.0 
Market revenue  260  144  0  666  0.553   
RA Net 
indemnities 19.78  44.03 0.00  161.87     
SURE payments  5.45  10.33  0.00  26.69     
Total revenue  285  113  158  666  0.40  -28.14% 
 
Notes: Figures are for the farm described in Table 1. We assume the insurance coverage rate is 
70%.  Total revenue includes direct payments. Revenue values are gross.  The acreage allocation 
in Scenario I mimics the actual acreage allocation for the three crops in Hyde County, SD. 
Scenario II drops soybeans and Scenario III drops corn and soybeans. 
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I. Land supply is completely inelastic
a 
No  insurance  0.285 0.715   --  1 
RA  insurance  0.332 0.668 0.85  1 
RA insurance and ad 
hoc payments  0.0631  0.937  0.80  1 
RA insurance and SURE  0.294  0.707  0.88  1 
II. Land supply is completely elastic 
No  insurance  0.718 1.621   --  2.339 
RA  insurance  1.267 2.758 0.85  4.028 
RA insurance and ad 
hoc  payments  1.274 2.787 0.85  4.061 
RA insurance and SURE   1.184  2.843  1.00  4.027 
RA insurance and SURE 
(upper bound on θ = 
0.85)  1.282 2.893 0.85  4.175 
 
Notes: Whereas actual RA crop insurance is bounded over {%55,85%} (although actual bounds 
vary by region), in the model it is bounded over {0%,100%}, except where noted.  
aMaximum land availability equals 1. 
bThe farmer’s RA crop insurance premium is actuarially fair before the government premium 
subsidy is applied. 
cThe farmer has a risk premium of 20%.   
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Table 4. Simulation results for the EU maximizing farmer for whom the RA crop insurance 












I. Land supply is completely inelastic
a 
No  insurance  0.285 0.715   --  1 
RA  insurance  0.261 0.739 0.80  1 
RA insurance and ad 
hoc  payments  0.367 0.634 0.65  1 
RA insurance and SURE  0.266  0.735  0.75  1 
II. Land supply is completely elastic 
No insurance  0. 718  1.621   --  2.339 
RA insurance  0.945  1.931 
 
0.80 2.876 
RA insurance and ad 
hoc  payments  1.263 2.896 0.80  4.159 
RA insurance and SURE  0.724  1.728  0.80  2.453 
 
aMaximum land availability equals 1. 
bThe farmer’s actuarially fair RA crop insurance premium is multiplied by 1/(1-0.59) before the 
government premium subsidy is applied. 
cThe farmer has a risk premium of 20%. 
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1 To be eligible for ad hoc payments, the farmer generally needs to have at least some minimal 
level of insurance coverage but the payment levels are not a function of the insurance coverage 
levels. SURE payments on the other hand are a direct function of insurance coverage levels.  
2 In the discussion in this section, we are abstracting away from the specific provisions of the 
Federal crop insurance program, in which a subsidy covers a portion of the full crop insurance 
premium cost. 
3 A number of authors have argued that premium rates are not actuarially fair and that some 
producers benefit from asymmetric information while others are charged higher than fair 
premiums (e.g., Just, Calvin, and Quiggen; Makki and Somwaru).   At best, as the insurance 
products are not calculated using individual-specific yield risk measure, they can only be 
actuarially fair on average.  
4  θ s  is the subsidy rate (.59 for 70% coverage). 
5 
 If the eligible farmer chooses to be in enrolled in the Average Crop Revenue Election program 
(ACRE) rather than in the traditional commodity program, then the CCP payment in t is replaced 
by an ACRE revenue payment, DP’s are reduced by 20% and the loan rate in the MLB by 30%. 
6 The reason that the second decimal place in the estimated coverage rates tend to be zero or 5 is 
that for the model, we have converted the discrete RMA subsidy schedule to a continuous 
schedule covering θ in bands of 0.05 increments over 0.55 to 0.85. For instance, for 0.65 ≤ θ < 
0.75, the premium subsidy is 0.59. For instance, for 0.75 ≤ θ < 0.80, the premium subsidy is 
0.55, etc. The subsidy is zero for θ ≥ 0.85. 
 